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JAPAN REPORT

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MILITARY

MEDIA REACTION TO DEFENSE WHITE PAPER REPORTED

Tokyo BOEI ANTENA in Japanese Oct 83 p 3-17

[Text] Defense White Paper: Military Cooperation With West Emphasized; Line on Arms Buildup to the Fore; Opposition Parties Voice Strong Criticism-- Only Democratic Socialist Party in Basic Agreement; Soviet Threat to the Fore; First Statements on Sealane Defense; Defensive Arms Buildup: No Brakes?; Danger of Involvement in Collective Defense; Militaristic Tone With a Soft Touch; Citizens' Arms Reduction Movement Ignored; Editorial: Dangerous Assertions in the Defense White Paper (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

First Statement of Sealane Defense; SS-20 and Backfire: Emphasis on Soviet INF; Line on Soviet Threat to the Fore; Emphasis on Increase in Cooperation With the West; Nakasone's Influence Clear; Buildup Development in Detail; Editorial: Is Japan a Member of the Western Camp? (MAINICHI SHIMBUN)

Increase in Soviet Threat Emphasized; Conspicuous Increase in Quality of Soviet Forces; Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security Structure, Beginning With Exchange of Military Technology; Defense of the Sealanes; Role as a Member of the West to the Fore; 108 SS-20's in Far East; Attacks in Strait Emergency; 1,000-Nautical-Mile Defense: Fait Accompli; Major-Power Attitude in Evidence; Editorial: Focal Points of Deterrence Necessary for Defense (YOMIURI SHIMBUN)

Clear, 'A Member of the West'; Emphasis on the Need for High-Quality Defense Strength; Buildup Centering Around Air Defense, Preparations Against Invasion, Sealane Defense; Increase in Soviet Far Eastern Forces: Potential Threat Is Growing; Insistence on Importance of Solidarity With the West; Development of Persuasive Arguments; Comment: A Defense White Paper Which Emphasizes Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security (SANKEI SHIMBUN)

Sealane Defense to the Fore; Again, Emphasis on the Soviet Threat; Japan-U.S. Alliance: Image Strengthened; Interpretation of Individual Defense--Intention to Increase Arms in Evidence; General Levels Achieved With the Medium-Term Defense Program Estimate Drafted in 1981; Public Mood On Defense Be Narrowed? (NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN)

Japan's Share of the Western Military Burden Clearly Depicted; Contribution to Maintainance of Security; Agreement on Closing the Straits; Emphasis on the Soviet Threat; Getting Into Position for a Shift to Collective Defense; Nakasone's Line on Military Buildup Followed; Editorial: How Far the 'Japan-U.S. Alliance' Has Come (TOKYO SHIMBUN)

Increase in Defense Strength; Service to World Peace (NHK)

Emphasis on Membership in Western Community (Fuji Television)

Increasing Confidence in the Japan-U.S. Connection (Asahi Television)

Sealane Defense as a Pillar; Emphasis on Defense Increase (Tokyo Television)

I. General

1. Line on Defense Buildup to the Forefront

The first defense white paper of the Nakasone administration reflects the policy stance of Prime Minister Nakasone leaning much more toward a Japan-U.S. military alliance, and the defense power build-up line seems to have settled in further. (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

Why must our country carry out a defense buildup? This year's white paper explains its reasons in even greater detail than ever before, and strengthens its logic. The logic is predicated on the Soviet military strength buildup; the change in the balance between East and West; cooperation between the countries of the West; efforts for defense as a member of the West; necessary preparation of the defense capability. (MAINICHI SHIMBUN)

This year's white paper differs from the previous ones, which called for the understanding by the people of the Self-Defense Forces. Reflecting such "hawkish" phrases as "U.S.-Japan community" and "unsinkable aircraft carrier," as well as the debate on defense in the regular session of the Diet, the white paper bears the strong imprint of Nakasone. (MAINICHI SHIMBUN)

The 1983 edition of the defense white paper gives readers a "lucid" impression. This is not only due to the change to color photographs and measures taken to make it easier to read, but also seems due to a basic policy of firmly stating what has to be said, rather than enclosing it in a sugar coating.

In comparison to former white papers, which contained "apologies" from beginning to end and roundabout expressions, it stated defense theory straightforwardly based upon more matured public opinion on defense, and seemed to be permeated with Defense Agency "confidence."

The main objective of this year's white paper was probably to establish a theory of why the preparation of a defense build up is necessary. The white paper combines the "theory of deterrent strength" and "Japan's position as a member of the West" in order to explain this point. (SANKEI SHIMBUN)

For the past several years, the content of the defense white paper has become increasingly easy to understand on the subjects of the international military situation, on what defense measures Japan is taking, and on the status and role of our nation's defenses. This is to be welcomed.

Instead of hesitation and inarticulateness, the present approach is refreshing and useful in settling questions. The underlying arguments supporting a defense buildup and for insuring the maintenance of security are also clear.

How our nation's security should be guaranteed--this defense white paper provides the basic materials for considering this problem. (SANKEI SHIMBUN)

This year's white paper could reasonably be called "Nakasone's military buildup white paper."

Last year's white paper focused on ways of dealing with the Soviet threat, but carefully adhered in its pronouncements to the limits of individual defense, and until now carried no frank tone implying a military buildup. This year's white paper gives the definite impression that even this minimal circumspection has been discarded.

To call this Nakasone's military buildup white paper means not only that it follows his aims for a military buildup. Searching for ways to transform the prime minister's thoughts on defense into explanations of policy, several statements have been presented as *faits accompli*. The Defense Agency is fulfilling the role of catching this ball which pitcher Nakasone has thrown.

Having stated that the strength of Japanese defense serves in maintaining the military balance between East and West, and having glossed over the legal regulations which place definite restrictions in cooperation with the U.S. military, what is the next aim of this white paper? Could it be to open a loophole in the principle of independent defense, in order to enter the realm of collective defense? This year's white paper may be considered as having laid the groundwork for this. (TOKYO SHIMBUN)

From the initial appearance of the Defense Agency White Paper, which has acted as a barometer indicating the rate of "arms buildup by installments" under Japan's peace constitution, up to the ninth edition in 1983, Japan has finally become an element in the military strategy of the West, and give indications of moving from the principle of independent defense to one of collective defense.

Against this background, Prime Minister Nakasone's forceful statements such as "the common destiny [of the United States and Japan]" and "[Japan as] an unsinkable aircraft carrier" are hardly to be wondered at. To be sure, this sort of ill-considered statement is carefully avoided in the white paper, but the content indicates a realization of Nakasone's aims. (TOKYO SHIMBUN)

Briefly stated, the most salient feature of the defense white paper is its strong reflection of the Nakasone Cabinet's concern with defense matters. With regard to the maintenance of our nation's defense strength, the white paper has gone from the former restrained statements concerning the importance of Japan as a member of the West, to positive assertions emphasizing the view that Japan's defense strength serves not only the West, but in turn the peace and safety of Asia, and of the world. (NHK)

The white paper spelled out even more clearly than previously Japan's position as a member of the West, and stressed the need for defense preparation centering on sealane defense, which has been strongly urged by America. (Fuji Television)

2. Strengthening Image of Japan-U.S. Military Alliance

Prime Minister Nakasone (who, as head of the Defense Agency, issued the first defense white paper), directed the Defense Agency to prepare the white paper in a low-key manner, but the result is a strong inclination in the "Military white papers" to report specifically the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the theory of the Soviet threat. (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

If questioned, the Prime Minister and other officials would probably affirm strict self-defense and limits on the scope of independent defense. However, the white paper is full of topics such as sealane defense, deployment of F-16 fighter-bombers at Misawa Air Base, furnishing military technology to the United States, joint Japanese-U.S. maneuvers, and so forth. The recent quickening tempo of the shift toward a Japanese-U.S. military alliance cannot be explained solely in terms of effective implementation of the terms of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Instead of a purely defense character, an active, collective-defense-oriented one is growing stronger. (MAINICHI SHIMBUN)

This white paper maintains that a strengthening of the Japanese-U.S. security structure is necessary, but a counterargument exists on this point. If the alliance between Japan and the United States is strengthened, Japan could be drawn into a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

However, if the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were to fight to earnest, this would lead directly to the destruction of the world. Deterrent strength is also important for guarding against that situation. It would be dangerous to create a vacuum of power in one corner of the West in order to avoid being drawn into a war. (YOMIURI SHIMBUN)

If one were to mention a special feature of this year's white paper, it would be the emphasis on the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Like water and air, this matter may seem to be something to be taken for granted, but it must be recognized again that this means safety with security for Japan.

Why is this? The guarantee of our nation's safety is promoted by diplomatic efforts which support a peaceful international environment, and by appropriate preparations to defend ourselves. However, as a first principle, the security of Japan is protected by holding fast to, and efficiently employing, the Japanese-U.S. security structure. If nothing else, this point must be kept clear.

In short, it is the Japanese-U.S. security structure, against a background of tremendous U.S. military strength, which accounts for the fact that there are no armed attacks against our nation. It can be said that deterrent power, against a background of nuclear strength, is the very thing which is preventing aggression and attacks. The consistent way in which the white paper emphasizes these matters is conspicuous. This is, perhaps, the point we should read with the greatest attention. (SANKEI SHIMBUN)

The white paper is putting strength into public relations in favor of even greater increases in, and support for, close cooperation by Japan and the United States on defense, and the reliability of the Japanese-U.S. security structure. Without a doubt, events strengthening Japanese-U.S. defense cooperation and mutual understanding have been continuing for the past year: the opening of Japanese-U.S. joint research on defense of the sealanes, policy decisions by the government to open the way for furnishing weapons technology to the United States, and the stationing of an American unit at Misawa Air Base. All these measures are in line with U.S. strategy regarding the Soviet Union, and the white paper presents, in sharp relief, the fact that the Japanese-U.S. alliance is strengthening military ties, and that Japan's defense preparations are incorporated into American strategy. (NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN)

The white paper calls for Japan, as a member of the Western camp, positively to align itself with American strategy toward the Soviet Union, and strongly reflects Prime Minister Nakasone's stance. (Tokyo Broadcasting Corp [TBC])

The white paper regards the Japanese-U.S. joint research on sealane defense, begun this year, as of great importance, states that the reliability of the Japanese-U.S. security structure has increased greatly, and further clarifies Prime Minister Nakasone's line on the joint destiny of Japan and the United States (Asahi Television)

As well as emphasizing Japan's position as a member of the Western community, this year's white paper made even more clear the increased closeness of Japanese-U.S. cooperation on defense; and the military aspects of the Japanese-U.S. security structure, which are founded on U.S. strategy regarding the Soviet Union, have received increased stress. (Tokyo Television)

3. A Color Edition of the Defense White Paper

U.S. military power is defensive, that of the Soviet Union, offensive: this is a color edition of the defense white paper which discards camouflage and classifies by color. (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

This year's white paper, the ninth since it first appeared in 1970, consists as usual of three sections: "The International Military Situation," "Our Nation's Defense Policy," and "The Present Status and Task of Our Nation's Defense." However, the use of color photographs, and, compared with last year's white paper, the enlargement of the section on the international military situation, mark this year's edition. (YOMIURI SHIMBUN)

This year's defense white paper has all photographs in color, in addition to color figures which were first introduced last year, and has a fresh look.

The apologetic tone has also disappeared, and the paper is permeated with clean-cut assertions. Amid the rising debate on defense, one gets the sense here of a confident Defense Agency which can speak for itself. (Fuji Television)

II. The International Military Situation

1. The Soviet Threat to the Fore

The emphasis placed on the international military situation, in comparison with last year's white paper, was due to criticism within the Defense Agency that the section was too brief. In other words, the major premise of the Soviet military threat was not given sufficient space.

Whether or not as a result of this "reconsideration," the section includes explanations based on concrete figures, charts showing the extent of the Soviet military buildup, 20 photographs, and, for the first time in a government publication, charts showing the range of the Soviet SS-20 missiles. Though this was taken from the U.S. Defense Department's 1983 publication, "Soviet Military Power," one cannot escape the feeling that the doctrine of the Soviet military threat is being deliberately boosted. (MAINICHI SHIMBUN)

The 1983 edition of the Defense Agency White Paper has appeared. Concerning the international military situation, the report emphasizes the Soviet buildup, and warns that if this situation is left as it is, the East-West military balance will tend to tip in favor of the East.

The majority of conventional weapons of modern military forces, to say nothing of nuclear weapons, are deterrent in nature. They are not for waging war, but are intended to prevent war through deterrent means. Moreover, it is a

fact that by maintaining the balance of deterrent forces between the United States and the Soviet Union, the principal powers of the Western and Eastern camps, the peace of the international community is maintained.

As the white paper maintains, it would be serious if something were to upset this balance. (YOMIURI SHIMBUN)

It has been customary for the last few years to emphasize the Soviet threat in the very first section which describes the international military situation.

In even greater detail, the present edition of the defense white paper documents the Soviet threat with specific figures, states that both the quality and the quantity of their military forces has been increased, and states that if things are left as they stand, the balance of military power will tip in favor of the East. (Nihon Television)

The white paper devoted an unprecedented amount of space to emphasis of the consistent Soviet buildup, which, if left to take its course, could cause a tilt in the military balance of power in favor of the East. The report threw into sharp relief arguments emphasizing the necessity of our nation's carrying out, on its own, high-quality defense preparations, which will serve world peace and stability. (Asahi Television)

2. Arms Control and Negotiations

The subject of arms control and negotiations to reduce military forces appeared in this year's white paper as an independent item. Last year, when the arms reduction movement was strong, a mere 11 lines were devoted to this topic; this year the coverage has increased to 4 pages.

However, the START talks and the negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces (INF talks) are simply explained; the movements against nuclear weapons and in favor of arms reduction around the world are not dealt with. In the section "How This Relates to Our Country," the report points out the "deep significance" of the commitment made by Prime Minister Nakasone, at the Williamsburg summit, to a "Japan-U.S./Japan-NATO alignment" in coordinating the response to the Soviet Union's deployment of the SS-20 missiles; independent or community-level movements in favor of arms reduction were ignored. (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

Perhaps the most important things is to maintain the balance of power between the East-West camps, while never forgetting efforts to gradually reduce arms levels.

This year's white paper deals with the subject of arms control, but it is regrettable that the urgency of this issue is lacking. (YOMIURI SHIMBUN)

With regard to arms control and arms reduction, the report emphasized that, on the matter of the INF talks, our nation's solidarity with NATO supports the U.S. position, and will contribute to the realization of arms reduction. It also places a high value on the mutual recognition, at the Williamsburg summit in May, that the safety of the West is indivisible. (SANEKI SHIMBUN)

The white paper presents and explains in a special section the INF reduction talks and other arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The report explains clearly the need to support the United States through solidarity with NATO, to counter the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe. (NHK)

The white paper takes up the subject of the U.S.-Soviet INF talks on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, which are now in a crucial stage; the Soviets have also deployed 108 SS-20 missiles in Asia. The white paper also repeats the assertion, made at last May's Williamsburg summit, that Japan's solidarity with NATO is necessary for the solution of this global problem. (Fuji Television)

3. The Soviet Threat Increasing Around Our Nation

As it did last year with regard to the Soviet military buildup, the white paper expressed the outlook that the potential threat to our nation is increasing. In particular, with regard to the renewed deployment of forces in the occupied Northern Territories, the report mentioned, among other things;

1. The strategic importance of the Sea of Okhotsk, as an area of deployment for the Soviet Union's ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), has increased.
2. For this reason the importance of the Northern Territories, which lie between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific, has also increased. (ASAHI SHIMBUN).

Concerning the military situation in the region of our nation, the white paper placed the doctrine of the Soviet threat in the forefront, stating that the Soviets are increasing the potential threat to our nation by carrying out a consistent enlargement, both qualitative and quantitative, of their military forces. Last year, the white paper did not account for the deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles and Backfire strategic bombers in the Far East with specific figures; this year the numbers were put at 108 and over 70, respectively. The report stated that SS-20's have been deployed in central Siberia and east of Lake Baikal, and are within range of our country.

The report elsewhere explained the "flexible response" deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers in the North Atlantic, and Sea of Japan, and the Caribbean; and, regarding the close proximity of U.S. and Soviet forces in the region of our country, the report stated that the U.S. 7th Fleet is maintaining a state of readiness at all times. (MAINICHI SHIMBUN)

The white paper reported, in specific figures, the deployment of 108 SS-20 missiles and more than 70 Backfire strategic bombers in the Far East. Moreover, the report pointed out that recently there have been instances of the newest weapons being deployed in the Far East almost simultaneously with their deployment facing Europe, and emphasized anew that the potential threat against our nation is being increased.

With regard to the United States, it was stated that ever greater efforts are being made for national defense. In particular, in the Far East, the latest F-16 fighters are planned for deployment at Misawa Air Base, in Aomori Prefecture, and an aircraft carrier task force will be deployed in the Sea of Japan. The report viewed this planned implementation of the "flexible response strategy" as evidence of the serious attention which this area is receiving. (YOMIURI SHIMBUN)

With regard to the military situation in the vicinity of our nation, there has been no fundamental change in the situation existing between China and the Soviet Union, or on the Korean Peninsula; however, the deployment by the Soviet Union of 108 SS-20 missiles and over 70 Backfire bombers, cited with specific figures in the white paper for the first time, and the military buildup in the Far East, was pointed out. The stationing of ground forces in division strength in the Northern Territories, our own national territory, has increased the strategic importance of the Sea of Okhotsk, and is viewed as an attempt to force de facto recognition of an illegal occupation. (TOKYO SHIMBUN)

The report explained in detail proceeding modernization of Soviet forces in the Far East, the deployment of 108 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in Siberia and east of Lake Baikal, and of over 70 supersonic Backfire bombers, and analyzes the increase in the potential threat to Japan.

Elsewhere, with regard to America, the white paper reports the decision to station F-16 fighters at Misawa Air Base, and the scheduled introduction into the Far East of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier U.S.S. Carl Vinson, as well as the battleship U.S.S. New Jersey, and presents a viewpoint indicating a shift toward serious concern for the Far Eastern area surrounding Japan, in conformity with America's "strategy of flexibility." (NHK)

III. Our Nation's Defense Measures

1. A Clear-Cut Presentation of Japan as a Member of the West

With regard to the 1983 edition of the defense white paper, the Defense Agency emphasized that the white paper, by its very nature, includes no specific policy statements or assertions. However, the aim of this year's white paper is to highlight the growth of Russian military power; in this way, the agency is attempting to gain the understanding and support of the public for a defense buildup to deal, as a member of the West, with this threat. It would seem evident that that is their goal on this point. The direction in which this first defense white paper of the Nakasone administration is pointing raises several important questions with regard to the fundamental defense policies of our country. (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

From a purely defensive armed force, the Self-Defense Forces are becoming an army of the Western camp. This year's white paper threw that fact into sharp relief. (MAINICHI SHIMBUN)

The distinctive features of this year's white paper were the stress placed on the increase of the Soviet threat, the unprecedented emphasis on Japan's role as a major nation with a great influence on the international situation, and its clearcut portrayal of Japan's solidarity with the Western camp.

For example with such statements as "our nation's efforts to increase our defense strength will contribute to the maintenance of the guarantee of security for the countries of the West through the East-West balance of power," or "the solidarity of our nation with the countries of NATO will support the position of the United States in the INF negotiations," one can feel in this white paper the attitude of a major power at every turn. (YOMIURI SHIMBUN)

The white paper points out that it is necessary for our nation to make efforts on defense so that the East-West balance will not be upset. We should take this opportunity to meditate again on the principle of deterrence, which forms a part of our efforts on defense, and is fundamental to the modern framework of peace. On this point, there is a necessity for the government also to make greater efforts to gain the broad understanding of the public.

In the case of our nation, when one calls for efforts on defense, there is an immediate reaction that such a move is dangerous. The emotional idea that inaction is linked with peace still seems to be deeply rooted. However, this emotional idea is itself dangerous, for one cannot consider peace while denying the importance of deterrent strength.

Also with regard to the budget allocations to complete the general defense objectives decided in 1976, the criticism was often heard that the allocations were too large. The portion of the 1983 budget allocated to defense is 5.5 percent the smallest among all of the Western countries.

Of course, it is good if small defense expenditures are sufficient, but it must not be forgotten that Japan is a member of the West. If a weak spot were to be created in the overall deterrent strength of the West, the framework for deterring conflict will be weakened. (YOMIURI SHIMBUN)

The white paper emphasizes Japan's position as a member of the West, asserts the importance of solidarity with the West and INF negotiations, which are now in a crucial stage, and explains, in this connection, the necessity for our nation to make defense preparations.

Briefly:

1. In order to obtain results from the INF negotiations, it is necessary for our nation to support the position of the U.S. through solidarity with NATO.
2. The safety of the West is indivisible, and as a member of the West, a role suited to our nation's strength (defense preparations) is called for.

With these assertions, the white paper is attempting to view the matter of defense preparations not simply as a domestic problem or as a dimension of the Japanese-U.S. relationship, but from the point of view of the Western

camp as a whole, and in turn on a global scale. It can be said that this has more real persuasiveness than the "ideology of peace" of some elements of the opposition parties, or a "unified anti-nuclear arms reduction movement." (SANKEI SHIMBUN)

In brief, the white paper first explains the Soviet threat, introduces the defense measures being taken by the United States to deal with the threat, and then states why Japan must also take responsibility for coping with this threat as a member of the West. In an international environment where the camps of the East and West face each other with vigilance, it is a fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are competing in a race to build more arms, including nuclear ones. The report states that increasing our nation's defense efforts will lead to strengthened reliability of the Japanese-U.S. security structure, and will serve the peace of Asia and in turn that of the world. However, defense preparations to deal with the Soviet threat will necessarily lead to enlargement of the armed forces, and increased defense expenditures. To the opposition parties, this sort of logic may reflect as a creation of such an environment for the endless military expansion.

In the meantime, even if the Defense Agency tries to raise forces suitable for a member of the West, the financial situation will make it very difficult to achieve the 1981 mid-term operations estimate (the defense procurement plan for 1983-87) within the projected period. Ironically, the greater the gestures made in the white paper, the more the likelihood that the United States will, on the contrary, receive an impression Japan is not living up to its promises. (NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN)

In the second section, on defense strength and the guarantee of our nation's safety, the report calls for the fulfillment of a reasonable responsibility toward the United States, which has lost its overwhelming superiority in the economic, political and military fields. In addition, the report stated:

1. The conduct of our nation, with a GNP which has reached about 10 percent of the world total, affects the international climate.
2. The efforts of our nation, a member of the West, to increase our defense strength, will lead to an even stronger guarantee of our nation's safety, and support the reliability of the Japanese-U.S. security structure.
3. As a result, Japan will contribute to the maintenance of the safety of the nations of the West through the East-West balance of power.

The white paper courageously recognizes that our nation's defensive power is as a part of the Western camp as a whole. There will doubtless be debate on the relationship of this point with our nation's policy of independent defense in the special session of the Diet in the fall. (TOKYO SHIMBUN)

The report mentions Japan's role as a member of the West as one pillar of our nation's defense, and emphasized that an increase in Japan's defense strength will not only guarantee the security of our nation, but will strengthen the reliability of the Japanese-U.S. security structure, and will contribute

to the West through the East-West balance of power. As a realization of this, in addition to air defense and preparations against invasions, the first mention was made of sealane defense, cooperation in stationing F-16's at Misawa Air Base, and Japan's position as a base against Soviet attacks. (TOKYO SHIMBUN)

With regard to Japan's coming to grips with defense matters, the report stated that efforts by our nation to increase its defense capabilities as a member of the West, serve the safety and peace of Asia and the world, and clarify and emphasize the position of Japan's defense preparations. (NHK)

With regard to Soviet military power, the report placed hope in the arms reduction talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also stated that as a member of the West, our country must make plans to make its own high-quality defense preparations. (Nihon Television)

The report took an implicit stance strongly favorable toward the American call for Japan to assume responsibility for the defense of the entire north-west Pacific area, and emphasized more than previously Japan's role as a member of the West. (TBC)

The most prominent feature of this year's white paper was the assertion, to be found in all sections of the report, of the extreme necessity of Japan's defense strength as a member of the West, in a difficult international environment. (Asahi Television)

2. First Statements on Sealane Defense

In a special 5-page section on defending marine traffic, the white paper emphasized the importance of defense of marine traffic, and preparations to defend the straits. This is undoubtedly meant to refer to Prime Minister Nakasone's statements on "[Japan as] an unsinkable aircraft carrier" and on the closure of the three straits, but the white paper leaves unanswered the question of how these statements relate to the conceptions of Defense Agency officials. (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

The Defense Agency put great emphasis in the white paper on what concrete defense measures were necessary to deal with the problems it outlined. For the first time, it was stated that Japan must maintain defense capability, and by setting clearly defined goals, give concrete form to the land, sea and air defense strategy hinted at in last year's white paper.

Last year, mention of sealane defense was avoided, but this year's report includes the debate in the regular session of the Diet on sealane defense, and one can feel the Defense Agency's confidence and adroitness. (MAINICHI SHIMBUN)

Last year's white paper simply reported, in abstract terms, that through the combined use of patrol, escort, air defense, and strait defense, marine traffic would be protected. "One-thousand natural miles" was of course not mentioned, nor was the question of how and to what point defense of marine traffic would be carried out. It can be said that this was because of apprehension over criticism from the opposition in the Diet.

This year's white paper contains the passage, meant for quotation during this spring's session of the Diet, "Marine traffic in the vicinity of our nation will be protected to a range of several hundred nautical miles, and, in the case of the sealanes, to a range of 1,000 nautical miles. At distances greater than 1,000 nautical miles, the U.S. Navy will be relied upon to provide general defense." Thus, the white paper made first mention of the 1,000-nautical mile limit, and recognized an actual responsibility for regional maritime defense by Japan. The report emphasized the necessity for efforts toward defense against submarine, surface, and air attack, and Defense Agency staff noted that the portion of the report on sealane defense was meant to be taken most strongly. However, just how far and in what way will these policies be reflected in action? Is it really fiscally possible effectively to defend an area of ocean as large as 1,000 nautical miles in extent? Is there no danger that Japan will be incorporated completely into U.S. global strategy? How will we deal with the increase in tensions caused by sealane defense? On these questions, the white paper is silent. (YOMIURI SHIMBUN)

The report indicates the following as defense capabilities which must be maintained: air defense, preparations against invasion, protection of marine traffic (sealane defense), as well as defensive surveillance, intelligence gathering, backup support, etc., and explains their present status in concrete terms. Assigning a leading role to all three arms of the Self-Defense Forces is the first test of their strategic capability. (SANKEI SHIMBUN)

A special feature of this year's white paper is its direct treatment of the issue of sealane defense, which has become a focus of debate in the Diet and of the defense cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, as well as its attempt to explain to, and gain the understanding of, the public on the subject of defense capabilities which must be maintained. In comparison to last year's white paper, which did not even come close to mentioning sealane defense, this year's report even includes a compilation of the debate on the subject in the Diet. One can say that the intention was to fix firmly the statements of Prime Minister Nakasone and the Defense Agency officials in the record, in order to reflect the line of the Nakasone cabinet on strengthening defense, and to broaden the interpretation of independent defense. (NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN)

The white paper explains what will happen if the statements of Prime Minister Nakasone are translated into policy. What about the concept of the "unsinkable aircraft carrier"? In the section on defense capabilities which must be maintained, the report deals for the first time with measures to cope with a situation of direct aggression; included were explanations concerning air defense capability, measures to cope with invasion, protection of maritime traffic, electronic warfare, and other defensive capabilities. Nine pages are devoted to thorough explanations concerning the effective use of the latest military weapons such as F-15 fighters, P3C antisubmarine warfare patrol planes, escort vessels, and so on. Two pages were set aside for the thoughts of the government on the subject of closure of the three straits surrounding Japan, and the escorting of U.S. vessels. (TOKYO SHIMBUN)

On the matter of sealane defense, which is being called for strongly by America, the matter had not been taken up until now, out of consideration for criticism which questioned whether this would lead to responsibility for an ocean region and involvement in collective defense. This problem was addressed for the first time in this year's white paper, which explained that plans were being made to defend the ocean around Japan to a distance of several hundred nautical miles, and in the case of the sealanes, to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles, with emphasis on the sealanes to the southeast and southwest.

On the other hand, as a necessary step toward responding to occasional threats against the sealanes, the way has been opened for defense of the northwest Pacific area, north of the Philippines and west of Guam.

Furthermore, the report stated that the U.S. military would be relied upon to provide general defense at distances beyond 1,000 nautical miles, and included content which could be taken to mean that Japan will provide for defense within that distance. The report assumed a stance of compliance with the United States call for Japan to take responsibility for the defense of the northwest Pacific. (TBC)

As concrete strategy, the report mentioned air, invasion, and sealane defense as three pillars of Japan's defense capability. In particular, with regard to sealane defense, the report laid down for the first time plans for the safety of maritime traffic from hostile military strategy, through the combined deterrent effectiveness of implementation of patrol and vessel escort in the surrounding ocean area, as well as defense of the straits. (Tokyo Television)

IV. The Present Status and Role of Our Nation's Defense

1. Taking Up the Issue of Defense Industry

The white paper pointed out that in recent years, defense-related industrial production has consistently stayed at 0.4 percent of total industrial output, and stated that this percentage, like that for defense-related expenditures as a portion of GNP, is one indicator of the position of the military in the public economy as a whole. (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

The white paper took up for the first time the subject of the actual condition of the defense industry, whose production of equipment has exceeded 1 billion yen, and again explained in detail the growth of defense expenditures, along with comparisons with defense expenditures in other countries. (SANKEI SHIMBUN)

Defense-related industry was taken up for the first time in the third section on the status and role of our nation's defense, and the report emphasized that industrial production does not depend much on defense production; in 1981, the percentage of total industrial production accounted for by defense production was around 0.4 percent about the same as bread or tire tube production. (TOKYO SHIMBUN)

2. Evolving Japanese-U.S. Defense Cooperation

Appearing for the first time in this year's white paper were the 1,000-natural-mile sealane defense, the decision to station U.S. Air Force F-16 fighters at Misawa Air Base, and the furnishing of defense technology to the United States. These measures have accumulated during a year under the Nakasone administration, and each of them involves important issues which could bring about sweeping changes in our nation's defense policies. (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

In addition to taking up the issue of sealane defense, which has been a defense measure on the part of Japan called for by the United States, the report also took up the stationing of U.S. Air Force F-16's at Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture), and the furnishing of defense technology to the United States. This clearly showed an increasing progression toward close cooperation with the United States on defense matters. (MAINICHI SHIMBUN)

The white paper disclosed introduction of a policy of furnishing the United States with defense technology, the acceptance of the stationing of F-16's at Misawa Air Base, the opening of joint research by Japan and the United States on sealane defense, and emphasized that the state of Japanese-U.S. cooperation on defense matters made further progress in the last year.

In particular, the report noted, in connection with sealane defense, that the closure of the "three straits"--the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits--is possible in an emergency, and that escort of American vessels by the Self-Defense Forces does not fall within the realm of collective defense prohibited by the Constitution. The white paper introduces the Nakasone Cabinet's new outlook in detail, and makes it clear that the condition of Japanese-U.S. joint measures has progressed in a legal sense as well. (NHK)

With regard to the past year's Japanese-U.S. cooperation on defense, the report noted that joint research on sealane defense has begun, that the way has been opened for furnishing weapons technology to the United States, and that the 1985 stationing of a U.S. Air Force unit at Misawa Air Base has been decided upon. The report emphasized that the reliability of the Japanese-U.S. security structure has further increased. (Nihon Television)

This year's white paper established the necessity of our nation's defense strength, and the strengthening of the Japanese-U.S. security structure, as a basic foundation, and further clarified Nakasone's policies, which gave birth to the phrase "the common destiny of Japan and the United States." The report presented the regularization of joint maneuvers, as well as other matters, as a series of faits accompli, and the confidence of the Defense Agency was everywhere apparent. (Ashai Television)

5. Other

This white paper is the ninth since the first one was published in 1970. It is always painful that the Defense Agency lectures the people from a one-sided and superior point of view. If the aim of the white paper is to gain

the understanding and sympathy of the public, it must address the concerns of all strata of society, and share discussion of problem points, as in, for example, West Germany's white paper. (ASAHI SHIMBUN)

Although the white paper does make an effort to achieve quantitative completeness, such as including the complete Diet proceedings on defense, such important sections as that dealing with sealane defense are left in difficult terminology. The white paper includes such explanations as, "Through the cumulative efficacy of blockage or gradual reduction of hostile military capability, by implementation of various measures such as patrol, vessel escort, air defense and port/strait defense, the security of maritime traffic safety is sought," but how many of the public are able to understand the aims of their government when they are expressed in the unwieldy language of a legal text? Unless steps are taken to make the text simpler and more easily understood, the gap between the outlook of the government and that of the people will never shrink. (NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN)

The next focus of attention will probably be the elimination of the limit of 1 percent of GNP for defense expenditures, and the actualization of port calls by ships carrying Tomahawk nuclear missiles for use in attacks against the Soviet mainland. As to how the government will deal with these problems, what the next white paper will report--we would like to point out that the situation has already come to a head, and ask, "Is this acceptable?" (TOKYO SHIMBUN)

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MILITARY

CHAIRMAN OF PEACE, SECURITY INSTITUTE GIVES VIEWS ON DEFENSE

Tokyo JITSUGYOKAI in Japanese 1 Feb, 1 Mar 84

[1 Feb 83 pp 24-27]

[Interview with Masamichi Inoki, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Research Institute for Peace and Security: "Thoughts on the Problem of Japanese Security--date, place and identity of interviewer not specified]

[Text] When will the regional conflicts in the Middle East, Central and South America or other areas in the world lead to a general East-West collision? The situation is filled with boundless danger, and today there is no sign that the roar of guns will cease. Even in Japan, the fact is that the surrounding threat has increased due to such factors as the tension on the Korean Peninsula, the transformation of the four northern islands [in the Kuriles] into military bases by the Soviet nuclear superpower and the deployment of SS-20's. So we asked Masamichi Inoki, chairman of the board of directors of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, what path Japan should take on behalf of its own peace and security, and for the peace of the entire world.

Use of Electronic Technology

Question: To begin with, when one thinks about out nation's security, although there is the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the world situation is changing moment by moment and nuclear weapons are in the proces of proliferating throughout the world. In such a situation, what will preserve Japan's security? Please comment on that area.

Inoki: The "Basic Self-Defense Policy of the Nation" was published in 1957 concerning Japan's security, and in it four policies were made clear. Among them, two are particularly important: the Japan-U.S. security arrangement and the development of self-defense power in accordance with national strength and conditions.

Adjacent to Japan are three communist powers, aren't there? Friendly relations have been firmly established with China, but North Korea and the Soviet Union must be viewed as particularly important in terms of our

nation's security. Their sense of values is different from that of our nation. I believe it is important for Japan to possess the sort of power that will discourage countries such as these from entertaining ambitions to intimidate Japan or take aggressive action against Japan.

One example of such power is defensive power. But in World War II, Japan joined forces with Hitler's Germany and did all sorts of things, so there are countries here and there which were our victims. Among them are China, the countries of Southeast Asia and part of India.

Therefore, it is not simply a matter of building up defensive strength. It comes down to the sort of defensive power that will restrain countries that have ambitions to invade Japan, that will cause them to give up the idea, while, on the other hand, we use our heads so as not to menace the countries which surround us.

Question: The balance is the difficult point, isn't it?

Inoki: If we possess too much power in quantitative terms, it will have the opposite effect. In qualitative terms, as well, if we possess transoceanic offensive capability, the countries around us will be suspicious, because they have not forgotten the Japan of World War II. Therefore, I suppose we should go on building up our defensive strength as much as possible in directions such as anti-aircraft and antisubmarine strength, which are useful only for defense and not for a transoceanic offensive.

Japanese electronics technology stands with that of America as the most advanced in the world, so if we make use of this, qualitatively we should be able to have an extremely high degree of defensive power. The main point is to put our efforts into this area.

As to the second point, no matter how much defensive power Japan wishes to possess, its territory is small, isn't it? Even if we wish to have air combat power, the training airspace in which the Air Self Defense Force trains is small. Nor can we build many airfields. After all, 80 percent of Japan's territory is mountainous, and the remaining 20 percent is extremely overcrowded.

Our opposite number, the Soviet Union, possesses vast territory. With China, we have been getting along in peace and friendship since the restoration of Japanese-Chinese diplomatic relations. At the time of the recent visit to Japan by Hu Yao-bang, for example, we exchanged "pledges of nonbelligerency," so we are safe in assuming that China does not pose a threat to our country.

China itself is also threatened by that mammoth entity, the Soviet Union, so it can hardly do anything against Japan. At present, China is concentrating on the Four Modernizations. Among them, industrialization is given highest preference, while modernization of the military is in last place.

Since this is the situation, as might be expected, the Soviet Union is the one that constitutes a threat to Japanese security. While we are on the subject, if North Korea were to invade South Korea, that would pose an extreme threat to Japan. But the protection of South Korea is an important mission of U.S. air, ground and naval forces stationed in Japan.

Since Japan is the one that protects the U.S. military bases in Japan, it means that, indirectly, Japan cooperates in the defense of South Korea.

The Strengthening of Anti-Aircraft and Antisubmarine Power Is an Urgent Task

Question: All sorts of patterns have developed on the basis of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, haven't they?

Inoki: They certainly have. There are often people who say that the Japan-U.S. security arrangement is unilateral, that is, one-sided, that it is not an equal military alliance, and that we should make it into something wherein both parties are on an equal footing. But I think that is an unrealistic view.

There is no way Japan could be on an equal footing with the United States. The United States is a military superpower, and Japan could be called a "previous offender" which caused trouble for a lot of countries in World War II.

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, too, operates only within the sphere of Japanese territorial land, waters and airspace, and their periphery, and within that area it is a mutual and reciprocal treaty. Japan, too, has a responsibility: that of protecting U.S. military bases in Japan, because this is indispensable to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, Japan has no need whatsoever to feel inferior. Rather it is standing on tiptoe and saying things like "make it equal" that is unreasonable.

Question: Because as long as we have the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the U.S. military will go into action if some country comes to attack Japan, right?

Inoki: That's right. I suppose that Japan would be placed in an extremely dangerous situation if the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty did not exist. For example, if the Soviets were to come to us saying "let us occupy, for your protection," the area of Hokkaido around Wakkanai in order to guarantee the security of the La Perouse Strait, if they came in force, it would probably be difficult to stop them with Japan's strength alone.

But Japan has America's support behind it, and the other party thinks that if such unreasonable aggression were perpetrated against Japan, it would have to fight America too, so this acts as a deterrent.

Question: There are some people who genuinely worried about whether or not America would really come to the rescue if Japan were invaded...

Inoki: That's silly. It is impossible to be 100 percent sure that it would come to help us, and immediately at that. Every day tens of thousands of couples get married, and although the man and woman solemnly exchange pledges, a certain number of couples from among them will get divorces, right? It is the same thing. It is a mistake to seek 100 percent certainty from America.

The situation is: "If some country invades Japan, America will probably act." That is the important thing. Japan is an extremely important country to America. If America were to lose Japan, the East-West balance would be completely upset.

This means that America is prepared to retaliate with nuclear weapons should there be a country which invades Japan. As long as that possibility exists, it is a deterrent and Japan's security is preserved. The vital thing is to nurture the Japan-U.S. security arrangement without getting nervous while, on the other hand, steadily building up the power to defend ourselves.

Question: What should be emphasized in regard to building up the power to defend ourselves?

Inoki: I think that air defense strength and antisubmarine strength are especially important. I believe it is desirable to put our effort into building up these areas.

Question: Chairman Ishibashi of the Socialist Party of Japan advocates "unarmed neutrality." What do you think of that?

Inoki: It is completely out of the question. Neutrality by itself is theoretically possible. But if one wishes to be neutral, a vast budget expenditure becomes necessary. Japan's current defense expenditure is on the level of 5 percent of the total budget. Other countries are generally in the 10 percent range, so Japan's expenditure is less. If we wished to maintain neutrality, it would not be possible to rely upon America, so in that case, we would probably have to allot 20-30 percent of the total budget to defense expenditure. It is hardly a matter of 1 percent of GNP. Because if it comes to 20-30 percent of the total budget, that is five to six times what it is now. It would be 5-6 percent of GNP. If we have the resolve to use that much, (laughter) there is some possibility of carrying on with armed neutrality.

Japan, Too, Should Prepare To Make Sacrifices for World Peace

But this would place the economy under extreme pressure, and the Japanese people's standard of living would probably plummet to the level that existed immediately following Japan's defeat in World War. II. Switzerland

and Sweden are carrying on that sort of armed neutrality, but they are blessed with favorable geographical conditions. Switzerland is a mountainous country, surrounded on all sides by mountains, so blitzkrieg tactics using tanks are difficult. And if its citizens are mobilized, about 700,000 will assemble within 48 to 72 hours. That's why armed neutrality is possible for it.

Armed neutrality is possible for Sweden because it is situated on the Scandinavian Peninsula, away from the region where the Warsaw Pact forces and the NATO forces confront each other.

But Japan is located at the very center of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Its population is 120 million, hard working and excellent, and its GNP is second in the world, isn't it? I think it is difficult, in this age of East-West opposition, for a nation this important to maintain neutrality, even if it is armed.

Another thing that must not be forgotten is that the East-West balance is being maintained through Japan's alliance with America. If we ignored this and broke away from the alliance with America, it would result in a tremendous advantage for the East. It is like a seesaw. That action alone would end up damaging world peace and security. I am sure you understand how very unrealistic it is to talk of unarmed neutrality and the like.

To be sure, in considering world peace, we cannot get along unless we establish friendly relations with the nations of the world. It is important for Japan to have friendly relations with as many nations as possible, especially because Japan lacks resources, and depends heavily on imports for both fuel and raw materials. On the government's part, as well, I believe it must go on making greater efforts on the diplomatic front. In that sense, too, I do not think that the present government's efforts for world peace are adequate.

Question: Exactly what sort of efforts should the government be making?

Inoki: I suppose it should be showing more of an attitude that Japan, too, is willing to make sacrifices for world peace. Otherwise Japan will become an outcast in the future. For instance, the dispatch of the Self Defense Force to act as a UN force. It is unacceptable to be concerned only with our own peace and security and not care about others. The world has gotten smaller, and the present situation is one in which, if some problem arises, be it in the Middle East or in South or Central America, it is impossible to say when it will lead to a general East-West confrontation. We will lose people's trust if we maintain an attitude that all we have to do is pay money to the United Nations and leave the dangerous matters to others. Because it will be too late for regrets when our own country is actually invaded.

But no matter what happens, our forces must not go to places such as the Korean Peninsula, or China, Southeast Asia or India, where we caused trouble during World War II. This is a point on which very, very careful thought must be given.

The people of those countries have not forgotten what Japan did in the past. Even if Japan went to help them with good intentions, it would not work out. Conversely, it would be an advantage in many ways, if Japan went, as one member of a UN force, to some region such as Africa or the Middle East where Japan has never gone before. If it is demonstrated to the world that Japan is making efforts for world peace, it is probable that the bad reputation--"Japan is self-centered; it wants to be protected when the time arises, but it does not want to do anything itself,"--will disappear. It is important to show that Japan is actively contributing to world peace.

Second, Japanese faces are known all over the world, so if Japan's Self Defense Force enters a trouble spot, be it in Kashmir, the Middle East or Africa, people will know at a glance that it is a part of a UN Emergency Peacekeeping Force.

Once, when there was a conflict in Zaire, UN forces from Sweden and Canada and so on went there with the object of maintaining order. When that happened, the people couldn't tell the difference between them and the local Belgian mercenaries, so UN soldiers were sometimes killed. If it were Japan's Self Defense Force, it would be possible to avoid such misfortune.

In that sense, too, Japan must make greater efforts for world peace. In regard to those efforts, the standpoint of Socialist Party Chariman Ishibashi, considering the Self Defense Force as an enemy and wishing to reduce it in size or to eliminate it over the course of time, that sort of unrealistic attitude has no usefulness for preserving world peace in the future. It may have had some meaning 20 or 30 years ago, but Japan's national strength is incomparably greater than it was at that time. International trust in Japan has also increased.

Recently Ishibashi's argument of unarmed neutrality was ridiculed in Peking, too, wasn't it? No matter where he goes, he is not taken seriously, because he is completely unrealistic. He fails to understand international common-sense.

There Should Be Adherence to the Three Nonnuclear Principles in the Future, as Well

Question: What about the question of nuclear weapons? I mean Japan's three nonnuclear principles, the breaking off of the INF negotiations, the activities of the antinuclear movement and so on.

Inoki: Japan is the only country that has been bombed with atomic bombs. Interest is particularly high. I think we should adhere to the three nonnuclear principles in the future, as well. It is clear from looking at a map of Japan, the narrowness--in military terms it is called "lack of depth."

If nuclear missiles were brought here, there would be no place to put them. Nations which have vast land areas, such as the United States, the Soviet Union and China, are different. They can build silos in a place where not many people live, and set up the missiles, but that is precisely where the greatest impediment lies in Japan.

If ICBM's were brought into Japan, the other side would find out right away by means of reconnaissance satellites. If it came to war, the missile sites would be the first things to be attacked. With Japan's overcrowded territory, we would be helpless.

Question: One shot and everything would be blown to pieces, wouldn't it?

Inoki: The accuracy of the latest nuclear missiles has risen, but the domain in which half the missiles are sure to strike is still measured in a radius of hundreds of meters. Including near misses, the proportion which hit the target is about 50 percent. The remaining 50 percent might go anywhere. Therefore, for Japan to possess ICBM's would be an act of suicide.

As to submarine-launched missiles, there are many difficult problems if one wants to have these, such as the fact that one must first have any number of facilities such as communications satellites and arrange them in such a way that it is possible to ascertain the submarine's position at all times. In this is it best to rely upon America.

A Short Biography of Masamichi Inoki

Born in Kyoto, November 1913. (Parents came from Ueno city in Mie Prefecture.) Graduated from the economics program of the Faculty of Economics, Tokyo University. [Employment:] The Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Corporation; Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute. After serving as a professor at Seikei University, in 1949 he became an associate professor at Kyoto University, and advanced to full professor. 1970: appointed president of the National Defense Academy; 1978: retired; 1981: awarded Medal of Honor with Purple Ribbon; LL.D., professor, Aoyama Gakuin University; professor emeritus, Kyoto University. Chairman of the board of directors of the Research Institute for Peace and Security. Writings include: "A History of the Russian Revolution," "The Genealogy of Communism," "New Lectures on Political Science," "The Political Thinking on Dictatorship,"

"The Cold War and Coexistence," "Guarding the Nation," "Thoughts on Security," "The Illusion of a Military Power," "A Critical Biography of Shigeru Yoshida" (three volumes) and many others. Interests: reading, appreciation of ceramic art, travel. [Children:] one son, three daughters.

[1 Mar 84 pp 80-84]

[Text] [Masamichi Inoki] points out important areas in the defense of our nation: what the nature of Japan's defense efforts should be in the "nuclear age," concrete proposals for strengthening the Self Defense Force, and others. These statements are directly connected with world peace and are also a "warning to the public" given to the people of Japan.

Even If One Has Nuclear Weapons, They Cannot Be Used

Question: Suppose Japan had nuclear weapons or was trying to get them. What would be America's reaction?

Inoki: It would not be one of welcome. America, too, probably does not want Japan, a former enemy, to arm itself with nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it would probably be on its guard. America still has not forgotten about Pearl Harbor. If it let Japan have nuclear weapons, there is no telling what Japan would do. I think America would be on its guard, and above all, it would take all sorts of measures to prevent Japan from obtaining them.

To be sure, with Japanese scientific technology, it would probably be possible to produce something of higher efficiency than the nuclear missiles currently in existence in the world, but Japan should not have nuclear weapons. This, too, is being handled according to the division of labor between Japan and America.

That is, in regard to the nuclear deterrent, Japan relies completely on U.S. nuclear war power. In exchange, Japan has full responsibility for the defense of the area surrounding Japan, including U.S. military bases in Japan. The Japan Self Defense Force, armed with conventional weapons, shoulders the entire mission and discharges its responsibility. I think this is a satisfactory arrangement.

There is almost a 100 percent probability that a U.S.-Soviet exchange of nuclear weapons will not take place. That much is clear. In other words, even if a country has nuclear weapons, they cannot be used.

Question: They are suicide weapons, aren't they?

Inoki: They certainly are. Nuclear weapons are not for use; this side has them as a countermeasure, because if the other side had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, it would use them to intimidate this side. That is, in regard to nuclear weapons, the important thing is the deterrent effect.

If one thinks about it in this way, one will probably understand how important conventional arms will continue to be in the future.

About 14 years ago, I spent a night with Ground Self Defense Force troops at Makomanai in Hokkaido. It was a technical regiment, what used to be called an artillery regiment. There was a "meeting to diagnose the Self Defense Force," and I went along with Morita and his group from Sony.

There we talked informally with the sergeants and officers until late at night. One of the sergeants, who would have been called a noncommissioned officer in the old days, came and asked: "Is there any meaning in training with cannons the way we are doing, in this age of pushbutton warfare? Is it any use?" So I answered: "This pushbutton warfare has too many uncertain elements, so actually it cannot be used. If we used it, the world would be dealt a fatal blow. People talk about the age of nuclear weapons, but each superpower has nuclear weapons because the other side possesses them and it would be dangerous not to have them. Since pushbutton warfare is impossible, the importance of conventional weapons will probably go on increasing." Even today, this is the case.

If some country were to invade Hokkaido, it would not use nuclear weapons. I don't know if the probability is 100 percent, but it is greater than 99 percent that it would attack with conventional weapons. For that reason, too, it is very meaningful from the standpoint of self-defense for the Self Defense Force to strive for perfection in conventional weapons and to carry on training.

There Should Be Adherence to the "Three Nonnuclear Principles"

Question: I suppose the public misunderstands things. Like saying that because this is the nuclear age, there is no sense in perfecting conventional weapons?

Inoki: That's right. In fact, nuclear weapons have not been used in any war fought in any region since World War II.

Not a single atomic bomb has been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. It is probably clear from that, too, how difficult it is to use nuclear weapons.

In that sense, too, I think that Japan should continue to adhere to the three nonnuclear principles: "Japan will not make, deploy or introduce nuclear weapons."

I think that on the basis of Japan's historical and geographical conditions, too, these three principles should be preserved. It is more profitable to keep these principles, at least until the beginning of the 21st century. If we were to abandon them, it would be an incalculable loss.

Question: How about the term "will not introduce"? This always becomes a matter of controversy when U.S. nuclear-powered submarines call at ports in Japan and so on.

Inoki: There is a misunderstanding there. Some of the Japanese people say that even for the warships of America, an ally, to pass through Japanese territorial waters constitutes "introduction," but actually that is not the case. "Introduction" [mochikomi], as shown in the English word "intorodakushon" [preceding word gives the Japanese pronunciation of the English word "introduction"], means to introduce land-fired nuclear weapons onto Japanese territorial land.

And another thing, for a warship of the U.S. Seventh Fleet such as the Midway to enter the port of Yokosuka or Sasebo is called a "port call," in other words a "poto koru" [preceding word gives the Japanese pronunciation of the English word], and has no relationship to introduction.

One can lump "passage through territorial waters" and "introduction" [as published] together and call them both "transit"--transit [preceding word in English], that is, "passing through." Considering this from a common sense standpoint, it does not touch upon the nonnuclear principles.

There is a strong possibility that even Soviet submarines are traveling back and forth through Japanese territorial waters, so there is no problem whatsoever about warships belonging to America, our country's ally, passing through.

To say that port calls and passage through territorial waters are not permitted and that we should send an inspection team to board the Midway in order to make an inspection is a wild argument, nonsensical in the extreme, which could easily lead to the basic content of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement being called into question.

As you are aware, a warship constitutes part of a country's sovereignty. It is covered by extraterritoriality. Do they think they can enter such a place and inspect? Is it impossible.

Because whether it is the Midway or the Enterprise, it is under U.S. sovereignty. Of course, this means that the same thing can also be said if a Japanese warship puts in at a foreign port.

The "entry and search" of warships is completely unacceptable to the world. It is necessary to be fully aware of this fact.

Moreover, the basis of U.S. strategy is to not make clear whether ships are carrying nuclear weapons.

If the Soviet Union were to discover that the Midway was not carrying nuclear weapons, it would probably be a great advantage to the Soviet Union.

There is significance in it not being able to know.

It Is Necessary To Build Up the Self Defense Force Reserve

Question: So, "entry and search" would only benefit the Soviet Union. It appears that Japanese public opinion lacks imagination on this point.

Inoki: It is a very clear matter that anyone will understand, just by using common sense.

Question: A situation is also conceivable in which the countries around Japan get nuclear weapons.

Inoki: It certainly is. It would be extremely dangerous for nuclear weapons to spread to Taiwan and Southeast Asia and so on, not to mention the two countries that confront each other on the Korean Peninsula, so it is an important role for Japan to adopt a world viewpoint and exert itself to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Question: And, as you say, those nuclear weapons, in fact, are effective as deterrents, but neither East nor West can really use them. Thus all nations appear to be working on technological innovation in conventional weapons and on a buildup of equipment. In that case, I think there is the question of the extent to which Japan must maintain conventional forces and weapons in order to protect the nation's security. Would you please comment on this point?

Inoki: As I mentioned briefly earlier, in the case of Japan there are two developments which can be considered. They are the strengthening of air defense and antisubmarine capability. The present strength of the Air Self Defense Force is clearly insufficient. The air training area itself is extremely limited, so the training level of members is below that of 10 or 20 years ago. The head of the Air Self Defense Force recognizes this.

The number of airfields is also insufficient. This is because we cannot build very many Air Self Defense Force airfields due to the fact that Japan's land area is small. And people complain about all sorts of things, such as noise pollution.

Matters are such that even at Atsugi Airbase, the aircraft of the Midway cannot carry out enough "touch and go" landing and takeoff practice.

Since Japan has the natural restrictions of small territory and overdensity of population, there are limits even if we try to increase our armaments and equipment. We cannot expand beyond a certain point.

In the case of the Ground Self Defense Force, as well, the fixed strength is 180,000 men, but at present there are only 150,000 or 160,000 men.

There are people who say "increase this," but that is an empty argument. The only places where division scale exercises can be held are Hokkaido and Mount Fuji. Units stationed in other areas cannot hold division scale exercises.

It makes one think, when people tell us to increase troop strength without considering such matters.

Question: Is there anything else that can be done?

Inoki: I think there is a need to greatly build up the strength of the reserve members of the Self Defense Force, the reserve. Unless we do this properly now, even if we have a Ground Self Defense Force of 150,000 or 160,000 men, who would defend the country if they happened to be destroyed?

Question: As you know, in some quarters a call has emerged to adopt a military conscription system. It is also said to be for the sake of putting some backbone into today's namby-pamby youth...

Inoki: That is true, but I think it would be impossible to put a conscription system into effect at this time under present conditions in Japan.

Also, the present volunteer system is better from the standpoint of gaining a consensus of the Japanese people on defense. America has a volunteer system, too, and so does Britain.

During the Falkland war, an army which had been well trained under Britain's volunteer system decisively defeated an Argentine conscript army, didn't it. Moreover, the British Army that landed was smaller in number; and it beat an Argentine Army that had two or three times the troop strength. The smaller group besieged the larger group. That was unprecedented.

Therefore, I think a volunteer system is best. The army with a volunteer system has higher morale. Under a draft system, there are some who do their work reluctantly. (laughter) That is something that cannot be avoided.

It is the same in every country: whether or not navy troops will board the ships is a big question. No matter how many warships one assembles, if the troops refuse to board the ships, that is the end of it.

The warships can very easily end up being useless.

In the case of Japan, we do not have territory as far away as the Falklands. At most, it is within a radius of 1,000 nautical miles. It is about 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo to the southern tip of Okinawa. It is also close to 1,000 nautical miles to Iwo Jima.

Lack of Troop Strength Should Be Made Up by Means of Missiles

Question: This means that the Self Defense Force is guarding the area from Hokkaido and the four northern islands to the outermost point of the Ryukyus by borrowing the power of the U.S. armed forces; the Self Defense Force could never do it alone, could it?

Inoki: No, it couldn't. Tremendous troop strength is required just to guard Japan's land and territorial waters. It is impossible unless we raise our air troop strength and antisubmarine troop strength. But, as I have been saying, air, land and sea each has limitations imposed by Japan's territory and population, so we cannot build up indiscriminately.

Therefore, I say that we should increase the relative importance of missiles. The cost per missile is high, to be sure, but viewed over the long term, missiles are the most economical by far.

Missiles will not take much space, either, so they are the most suitable for Japan with its small territory.

Question: That is true, isn't it.

Inoki: If Japan's land and territorial waters were covered by a network of the latest missiles, it would probably be difficult for any country that wanted to invade Japan to act. I think such ambitions would be stopped before they were acted upon. This should be started before anything else.

Next is the strengthening of antisubmarine power. This would be done chiefly through combined operations by submarines and surface warships with aircraft; and first of all, one must have the capability to detect the opponent's submarines. That is the most important thing.

Once, 12 or 13 years ago in America, I asked a specialist in the field for his opinion. I said: "Japan cannot attach nuclear warheads on antisubmarine missiles or torpedoes because of the three nonnuclear principles. If it really came to a war, could we get along without them?"

He laughed, and said: "The most important thing in antisubmarine capability is detecting the submarine and verifying its position."

If one detects and clearly grasps the submarine's position, one has already won. Because one can sink it completely with torpedoes, missiles or depth charges equipped with conventional warheads. Detection is everything.

On that point, Japanese science and technology are advanced, so it should be a simple matter to bring our detection capability up to world level. It is necessary to place emphasis on this from now on.

The same thing can probably be said for air defense. We spread an air defense network around Japan equipped with the latest electronics, and deploy missiles.

Because in something like this, the restrictions imposed on Japan by its small territory and overly dense population will not be a problem.

Question: It is a task on which the government and private sector should unite, isn't it?

Inoki: In regard to the defense of the four straits (the La Perouse Strait, the Tsugaru Strait and the two Tsushima Straits), as well, if we were to blockade them during peacetime, it would be precisely the sort of thing that would give the Soviet Union an excuse to invade Japan, so of course we should not and must not do that. But we must possess the capability to blockade them at any time in order to be prepared for an actual emergency.

Moreover, possessing this capability is meaningless unless we make it known to the other party in advance. This is a very important point.

If that is done, the other party will recognize that Japan is not a country to be despised. This becomes the deterrent. It becomes impossible to move against Japan with impunity.

For instance, there should be peacetime placement of sonar equipment below the surface of the sea in the four straits through which Soviet warships pass, so that it would be there when needed. Then, if it ever came to war, all we would have to do would be to detect with this equipment and take care of them one by one. That would be effective.

In addition, we should possess the capability to quickly lay mines should the necessity arise. Nowadays, it appears that this is done by aircraft in most cases, but we must equip ourselves now with the capability to do this quickly in case of necessity.

Conversely, we must always possess the capability to sweep away any mines laid by an opponent. Japan is excellent in this field, but we must raise our capability still further.

The Building of Shelters To Protect Weapons

Question: Japan is surrounded by ocean, so it would be a big problem if mines were laid by an opponent, wouldn't it?

Inoki: It would. I have not mentioned it up to now, but although the numbers are small, Japan possesses weapons that are as good as any in the world. In aircraft there is the F-15. The Soviet Union does not yet have a fighter or fighter-bomber to equal it. But I suppose the Soviet Union, too, will bring out a plane to compete with it soon.

Question: How far behind the free world is the Soviet Union in the development of this type of weapon?

Inoki: In general terms, it is pretty far behind. In particular, there is the effect of the lag in electronics technology. What showed even more how full of defects the Soviet weapons are was the fact that the year before last (1982) when Syria and Israel had an air war, 86 of the Syrian Air Force's newest MIG fighters were shot down by Israel's new and powerful planes. Not one Israeli plane was shot down. It was 86 to zero. It resembles the score in a game of American football or rugby, doesn't it? (laughter) The Syrian Air Force planes were piloted by Syrians, but even so, the figures are terrible. They show how inferior the MIG is.

Question: If MIG's are not up to much, does that mean that Japan's skies are "safe" to some extent?

Inoki: No matter how superior the fighters that Japan possesses, we do not have shelters to protect them from foreign enemies. There is a great danger that they would be destroyed by missiles or bombs before takeoff. Therefore, no matter how marvelous the weapons one has, all is lost if they are blown up before hand.

Question: That means that while it is also necessary to perfect weapons, an even more important matter is that they will be useless unless shelters are also built quickly, correct?

Inoki: Japan has not made enough of that kind of mundane effort. As the well-known saying puts it: "The fact that we do not have bullets to shoot occasionally is a flaw in the jewel." Whether it concerns missiles, land or sea cannons, shells for tank cannons, depth charges, torpedoes, or bullets for machineguns and rifles and so on, the present Self Defense Force does not even have enough ammunition for exercises. No matter how many tanks one has, if there is no ammunition for them, they are nothing more than lumps of steel.

Escort vessels, in other words, destroyers, even these, however many one assembles, are useless unless there are missiles, cannon shells, torpedoes and so on.

Question: That is true, isn't it.

Inoki: Of course we must increase Japan's power to defend itself by the most superior weapons possible; it is an important matter. But it is a case of "please do not forget the ammunition either." (laughter)

From the very beginning the present Self Defense Force has lacked that sort of rear area support capability. I think that efforts should also be made in that direction from now on.

Interviewer: I see. Thank you for giving so much of your time.

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TIME UTILIZATION IN AUTO MANUFACTURING

Tokyo RODO SEISANSEI TOKEI CHOSA HOKOKU in Japanese Mar 83 pp 162-169

[Text] (19) Auto and Auto Parts Manufacturing

Definition of Terms and Matters To Be Attended To in Their Utilization

(1) Items of Investigation

1) Motorcars under study include only standard motorcars and small four-wheel motorcars. Special cars, light four-wheel cars, light three-wheel cars and two-wheel cars are not included.

2) Classification of Items of Investigation and the Scope of Objects

a. Engine Division

Engines included in this division are those which are assembly-finished without transmission. These are classified by displacement into the four following classes:

(a) Small Passenger Cars

Of more than 500 cc and less than 2,000 cc.

(b) Standard Cars (Gasoline-fueled Cars)

Of over 2,000 cc.

(c) Standard Cars (Diesel-fueled Cars)

Of over 2,000 cc and less than 7,000 cc.

(d) Standard Cars (Diesel-fueled Cars)

Of over 7,000 cc.

b. Sash Unit Division

The sash unit division covers the group (number of units) of finished parts (body frame, power train, starter, motor, suspension, system and steering) which combine to form one finished car when assembled.

Production volume is divided into small passenger cars, small trucks, standard trucks (of less than 7,000 cc), standard trucks (of over 7,000 cc). Sash units for standard passenger cars are excluded. Sash units for buses are included in the units for trucks.

c. Body and General Assembly Division

(a) Body-cabin refers to the finished parts of press and sheet metal welded to form the cabin and rear body for a small truck or a standard and truck cabin.

Bodies or cabs for both trucks and passenger cars installed on passenger car chassis are classified as passenger car bodies, and those installed on small trucks are classified as truck cabs.

Standard passenger car and bus bodies and standard truck rear bodies are not included.

(b) Production volumes in "general assembly" are, for small passenger cars, the number of finished cars and, for small trucks, the number of off-line finished cars with rear bodies. Standard trucks include units with chassis having cabs, and are divided by displacement into those of less than 7,000 cc and those of over 7,000 cc. Bus sashes are included in volumes for trucks.

(2) Production Processes

Production processes are divided into the direct processes of direct products manufacturing, and the support processes (auxiliary manufacturing sector) that service the direct processes.

Direct processes consist of casting, forging, press, machine processing, heat treatment, coating, assembly and adjustment. But for purposes of this investigation they are divided into the engine division, sash unit division, body-cabin division, and the general assembly division.

Also, support processes are divided into the transportation, warehouse, forging tool, repair, power and inspection processes.

(3) Working Hours

1) Process Classification of Direct Working Hours and Contents of Their Work

a. Casting: This includes sand adjustment (preparation, mixing, and kneading of sand for the main die and the intermediate die), mold (making, assembling of molds and boiled water pouring) and intermediate mold (making of intermediate molds and cast finishing).

Note: Forgeable casting is included in this process. But wooden and metal die making is included under "forging tool" in indirect working hours (which will be described later), and is excluded from the casting process.

b. Forging: This includes heating materiel and pounding with the press machine, and leading up to fabrication.

Note: Hot cutting is included in the forging process. But metal die making is counted in the "forging tool" in the indirect working hours, and is excluded from the forging process.

c. Press: This includes the cutting of sheet metal, steel materiel, fabrication by the press machine or manual correction and the welding of fabricated parts.

Note: Manual correction is included in the press and sheet metal process, but frame assembly is excluded. Also, the welding of front suspension and rear axle housing which is done outside the press plant is counted in the assembly process.

d. Machine Processing: This includes the cutting and processing of rough die materiel that has come through the casting and forging processes, and the grinding and finishing of such materiel.

Note: Machine repair is included as "repair work" under indirect working hours. Forging tool repair and tool grinding is similarly included with "forging tools" under indirect working hours.

e. Heat Treatment: This includes refining quenching, cementation quenching and hardening quenching by the high frequency electric current.

Note: Cementation prevention plating is included in this process.

f. Coating: This includes surface coating (undercoating and finish coating), and other coating and drying work.

Note: Bitumastic puttying (coating to prevent damage) is included in this process, but partial coating following the processing and assembly is counted in the processing assembly process, and is not included in the coating process.

g. Assembly:

- (a) Test driving is not included in the engine division. Transmission assembly is included in the sash unit division.
- (b) The chassis unit division includes assembly of the frame, power trains, suspension system, motor, and other systems.
- (c) The body-cab division includes assembly of small passenger car bodies, small truck cabs and rear bodies, and standard truck cab panels previous to painting. (But in the case of standard trucks, rear body assembly is not included in this process.)
- (d) The general assembly division includes small passenger car bodies, small truck cabs and bodies, standard truck cabs, assembly and installation of all sash units and the work related to engine, electric coating, and assembly and installation of internal and external attachments. (But in the case of standard trucks, rear body assembly and installation is not included in this process.)

h. Adjustment: Engine adjustment (test driving is included), and adjustment up to the time of the final inspection and delivery.

2) Classification and Description of Support Work

a. Transportation: Automobile transportation (transportation by bus and passenger car not included), other minor transportation (such as transportation of materiel from the warehouse to processing plant using battery-powered cars, loading, packing, unpacking and other transportation-related work.

Transportation carried out with personnel and materiel belonging to the plant, such as delivery of materiel and picking up orders, is included in transportation even if it originates or terminates outside the plant.

But all transportation of finished cars and sashes is excluded.

b. Warehouse: This includes transportation, arrangement in the warehouse, receiving and paying, cutting materiel, and rust proofing work. If a worker belongs to the warehouse (section or subsection), but is engaged exclusively in transportation within the plant, his working hours are included in transportation. Warehouses for auxiliary materiel (office supplies) are excluded.

c. Forging Tools: This includes the making and management of forging tools, wooden dies (metal dies included), and tools (including their auxiliary grinding).

d. Repair Work: This includes the repair work on machine facilities in the direct processes.

Manufacturing of parts needed for repair is all included in this process. Repair and design of power and transportation equipment, repair work related to facilities for trial manufacturing and repair work ordered outside are excluded.

e. Power: This includes steam, water supply, air compressor, oxygen, oil, alteration and distribution of electricity, (including power generation), and attendant piping and wiring.

f. Inspection: This includes the inspection of materiel, parts, and finished products. Inspection of machine facilities, forging of tools and gages, testing and inspection for research and trial manufacturing are excluded.

Table 1. Direct Working Hours Needed Per Motorcar by Kind and Division
(Unit: Hour)

| (1) 区 分 | (2) 48年 | (3) 49年 | (4) 50年 | (5) 51年 | (6) 52年 | (7) 53年 | (8) 54年 | (9) 55年 | (10) 56年 |
|----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| (11) 小型乗用車 | | | | | | | | | |
| (12) 合 計 | 28.12 | 27.79 | 25.88 | 23.39 | 23.25 | 20.40 | 19.14 | 17.69 | 19.71 |
| (13) エンジン部門 | 5.45 | 5.18 | 4.59 | 4.02 | 3.92 | 3.34 | 3.16 | 3.18 | 3.49 |
| (14) シャシーユニット部門 | 4.64 | 4.64 | 4.60 | 4.27 | 4.11 | 3.59 | 3.27 | 3.20 | 3.64 |
| (15) ボディーキャビン部門 | 5.55 | 5.66 | 5.43 | 4.90 | 4.81 | 4.28 | 3.82 | 3.75 | 3.90 |
| (16) 総組立部門 | 12.48 | 12.31 | 11.25 | 10.20 | 10.41 | 9.19 | 8.89 | 7.56 | 8.68 |
| (17) 小型トラック | | | | | | | | | |
| (18) 合 計 | 28.96 | 27.77 | 25.61 | 23.23 | 22.39 | 21.06 | 19.42 | 17.65 | 19.82 |
| (19) エンジン部門 | 5.45 | 5.18 | 4.59 | 4.02 | 3.92 | 3.34 | 3.16 | 3.18 | 3.49 |
| (20) シャシーユニット部門 | 6.06 | 6.24 | 5.54 | 4.93 | 4.52 | 4.36 | 3.43 | 2.94 | 3.40 |
| (21) ボディーキャビン部門 | 6.68 | 6.41 | 5.77 | 6.00 | 5.60 | 5.38 | 4.98 | 4.47 | 4.90 |
| (22) 総組立部門 | 10.77 | 9.94 | 9.60 | 8.28 | 8.35 | 7.98 | 7.85 | 7.06 | 8.03 |
| (23) 普通型ガソリントラック | | | | | | | | | |
| (24) 合 計 | 42.34 | 42.06 | 28.63 | 31.20 | 29.56 | 25.15 | 24.70 | 24.02 | 21.79 |
| (25) エンジン部門 | 8.60 | 7.95 | 5.12 | 5.17 | 5.45 | 3.55 | 3.21 | 5.21 | 5.85 |
| (26) シャシーユニット部門 | 14.27 | 13.69 | 8.15 | 9.39 | 8.68 | 7.67 | 6.43 | 5.71 | 5.63 |
| (27) ボディーキャビン部門 | 7.32 | 7.82 | 4.14 | 6.93 | 5.95 | 5.92 | 5.59 | 4.87 | 5.64 |
| (28) 総組立部門 | 12.15 | 12.60 | 11.22 | 9.71 | 9.48 | 8.31 | 9.47 | 8.23 | 7.67 |
| (29) 普通型ジーゼルトラック | | | | | | | | | |
| (30) (7,000cc以下のもの) | | | | | | | | | |
| (31) 合 計 | 49.62 | 48.86 | 35.94 | 35.79 | 32.55 | 29.83 | 28.41 | 24.02 | 23.89 |
| (32) エンジン部門 | 15.88 | 14.75 | 12.43 | 10.05 | 8.44 | 7.93 | 6.92 | 5.21 | 4.95 |
| (33) シャシーユニット部門 | 14.27 | 13.69 | 8.15 | 9.10 | 8.68 | 7.67 | 6.43 | 5.71 | 5.63 |
| (34) ボディーキャビン部門 | 7.32 | 7.82 | 4.14 | 6.93 | 5.95 | 5.92 | 5.59 | 4.87 | 5.64 |
| (35) 総組立部門 | 12.15 | 12.60 | 11.22 | 9.71 | 9.48 | 8.31 | 9.47 | 8.23 | 7.67 |
| (36) (7,000ccを超えるもの) | | | | | | | | | |
| (37) 合 計 | 105.33 | 111.25 | 114.56 | 96.73 | 93.39 | 85.84 | 91.19 | 90.31 | 93.73 |
| (38) エンジン部門 | 30.50 | 35.70 | 31.30 | 25.89 | 25.97 | 21.79 | 20.54 | 21.58 | 20.92 |
| (39) シャシーユニット部門 | 46.20 | 45.58 | 44.91 | 37.10 | 33.65 | 32.38 | 36.02 | 33.56 | 36.16 |
| (40) ボディーキャビン部門 | 9.28 | 9.17 | 10.93 | 11.01 | 11.34 | 12.28 | 11.00 | 11.02 | 12.25 |
| (41) 総組立部門 | 19.35 | 20.80 | 27.42 | 22.73 | 22.43 | 19.39 | 23.63 | 24.15 | 24.40 |

Key:

1. Classification
2. 1973
3. 1974
4. 1975
5. 1976
6. 1977
7. 1978
8. 1979
9. 1980
10. 1981
11. Small passenger cars
12. Total
13. Engine division
14. Sash unit division
15. Body-cab division
16. General assembly division
17. Small trucks
18. Total
19. Engine division
20. Sash unit division
21. Body-cab division
22. General assembly division
23. Ordinary gasoline cars
24. Total
25. Engine division
26. Sash unit division
27. Body-cab division
28. General assembly division
29. Ordinary diesel trucks
30. (of less than 7,000 cc)
31. Total
32. Engine division
33. Sash unit division
34. Body-cab division
35. General assembly division
36. (of more than 7,000 cc)
37. Total
38. Engine division
39. Sash unit division
40. Body-cab division
41. General assembly division

Table 2. Direct Working Hours Needed Per Motorcar by Kind and Process
(Unit: Hour)

| (1)区分 | (2)合計 | (3)小 型 車 | | (6) 普 通 車 | | |
|--------------|-------|----------|---------|-----------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | | (4)乗用車 | (5)トラック | (7)ガソリン トラック | (8)–ゼルトラック (7,000cc以下 のもの) | (9)ゼルトラック (7,000ccを超 えるもの) |
| (10)合 計 | 20.71 | 19.71 | 19.82 | 21.79 | 23.89 | 93.73 |
| (11) 粗 型 材 | 6.08 | 5.75 | 6.66 | 7.44 | 7.98 | 17.28 |
| (12) 機 械 加 工 | 3.55 | 3.04 | 3.05 | 4.51 | 5.24 | 34.09 |
| (13) 組 立 | 2.41 | 2.23 | 2.07 | 2.17 | 3.00 | 17.96 |
| (14) 総 組 立 | 8.66 | 8.68 | 8.03 | 7.67 | 7.67 | 24.40 |

Key:

1. Classification
2. Total
3. Small cars
4. Passenger cars
5. Trucks
6. Standard cars
7. Gasoline trucks
8. Diesel trucks (of less than 7,000 cc)
9. Diesel trucks (of over 7,000 cc)
10. Total
11. Rough die materiel
12. Machine processing
13. Assembly
14. General assembly

Table 3. Direct Working Hours Needed Per Engine by Kind and Production Process
(Unit: Hour)

| (1) 区 分 | (2) 合 計 | (3) 小型乗用車 及 び ト ラ ッ ク | (4) 普 通 車 | | |
|--------------|---------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--|--|
| | | | (5) ガソリン ト ラ ッ ク | (6) ディーゼルトラック (7,000 cc以下 の も の) | (7) ディーゼルトラック (7,000 ccを超 えるも の) |
| (8) 合 計 | 3.80 | 3.49 | 2.85 | 4.95 | 20.92 |
| (9) 粗 型 材 | 1.13 | 1.19 | 0.43 | 0.97 | 1.78 |
| (10) 機 械 加 工 | 1.36 | 1.13 | 1.47 | 2.20 | 10.17 |
| (11) 組 立 | 1.30 | 1.17 | 0.95 | 1.78 | 8.97 |

Key:

1. Classification
2. Total
3. Small passenger cars and trucks
4. Standard cars
5. Gasoline trucks
6. Diesel trucks (of less than 7,000 cc)
7. Diesel trucks (of over 7,000 cc)
8. Total
9. Rough die materiel
10. Machine processing
11. Assembly

Table 4. Direct Working Hours Needed Per Sash Unit by Kind and Process
(Unit: Hour)

| (1) 区 分 | (2) 合 計 | (3) 小 型 車 | | (6) 普 通 車 | |
|--------------|---------|-----------|-------------|---|--|
| | | (4) 乗 用 車 | (5) ト ラ ッ ク | (7) ガソリン及びジーゼル ト ラ ッ ク (7,000 cc 以 下 の も の) | (8) デ ゼ ル ト ラ ッ ク (7,000 cc を 超 え る も の) |
| (9) 合 計 | 4.02 | 3.64 | 3.40 | 5.63 | 36.16 |
| (10) 粗 型 材 | 0.72 | 0.66 | 0.57 | 1.37 | 3.25 |
| (11) 機 械 加 工 | 2.19 | 1.91 | 1.92 | 3.04 | 23.92 |
| (12) 組 立 | 1.11 | 1.06 | 0.90 | 1.22 | 8.99 |

Key:

1. Classification
2. Total
3. Small cars
4. Passenger cars
5. Trucks
6. Standard cars
7. Gasoline and diesel trucks (of less than 7,000 cc)
8. Diesel trucks (of over 7,000 cc)
9. Total
10. Rough die materiel
11. Machine processing
12. Assembly

Table 5. Direct Working Hours Needed Per Body-Cabin Unit by Kind
(Unit: Hour)

| (1) 区 分 | (2) 合 計 | (3) 小 型 車 | | (6) 普 通 車 | |
|--------------|---------|-----------|-------------|--|--|
| | | (4) 乗 用 車 | (5) ト ラ ッ ク | (7) ガ ソ リ ン 及 び デ イ ゼ ル ト ラ ッ ク (7,000 cc 以 下 の も の) | (8) デ イ ゼ ル ト ラ ッ ク (7,000 cc を 超 え る も の) |
| (9) プレス・板金組立 | 4.23 | 3.90 | 4.90 | 5.64 | 12.25 |

(10) (注) 小型トラックはキャビン及びリヤボディ、普通トラックはキャビンの製造に要した直接労動時間である。

Key:

1. Classification
2. Total
3. Small cars
4. Passenger cars
5. Trucks
6. Standard cars
7. Gasoline and diesel trucks (of less than 7,000 cc)
8. Diesel trucks (of over 7,000 cc)
9. Press sheet metal assembly
10. Note: In the case of small trucks direct working hours are for cabin and rear body; in the case of standard trucks direct working hours are for cab.

Table 6. Direct Working Hours of General Assembly Needed Per Motorcar by Kind
(Unit: Hour)

| (1) 区 分 | (2) 計 | (3) 小 型 車 | | | (7) 普 通 車 | | |
|---------------|-------|-----------|---------|---------|-----------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | (4) 計 | (5) 乗用車 | (6) フック | (8) 計 | (9) ガソリン及びジーゼルトラック(7,000 cc以下のもの) | (10) ディーゼルトラック(7,000 ccを超えるもの) |
| (11) 全装・組立・調整 | 8.66 | 8.56 | 8.68 | 8.03 | 10.43 | 7.67 | 24.40 |

Key:

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| 1. Classification | 7. Standard cars |
| 2. Total | 8. Total |
| 3. Small cars | 9. Gasoline and diesel trucks (of less than 7,000 cc) |
| 4. Total | 10. Diesel trucks (of over 7,000 cc) |
| 5. Passenger cars | 11. Coating, assembly, adjustment |
| 6. Trucks | |

Table 7. Indirect Working Hours Per Unit of Motorcar by Process
(Unit: Hour)

| (1) 区 分 | (2) 計 | (3) 通 信 庫 | (4) 研 刷 | (5) 修 理 工 作 | (6) 力 力 | (7) 檢 証 |
|-----------------|-------|-----------|---------|-------------|---------|---------|
| (8) 1台当たり間接労働時間 | 10.58 | 2.30 | 2.50 | 2.70 | 0.77 | 2.31 |

Key:

1. Classification
2. Total
3. Transportation, warehouse
4. Forging tool
5. Repair work
6. Power
7. Inspection
8. Indirect working hours per unit

Table 8. Kind of Workers and Personnel Deployed by Division (as of end of November)
(Unit: Person)

| (1) 区 分 | (2) 合 計 | (3) 直 用 労 働 者 | | | (7) 直用以外の 勞 働 者 |
|------------------|---------|---------------|----------|----------|--------------------|
| | | (4) 計 | (5) うち臨時 | (6) ちパート | |
| (8) 合 計 | 232,621 | 231,568 | 8,151 | 563 | 1,053 |
| (9) 製 造 部 門 | 110,791 | 110,108 | 6,811 | 337 | 683 |
| (10) 粗 型 材 | 29,731 | 29,342 | 1,364 | 86 | 389 |
| (11) 鋳 造・鍛 造 | 8,551 | 8,309 | 392 | 80 | 242 |
| (12) 熱 处 理 | 1,772 | 1,765 | 75 | 1 | 7 |
| (13) プ レ 斯・板 金 | 19,408 | 19,268 | 897 | 5 | 140 |
| (14) う ち 溶 接 | 10,028 | 9,964 | 574 | 0 | 64 |
| (15) 機 械 加 工 | 23,607 | 23,553 | 1,055 | 48 | 54 |
| (16) 組 立 | 57,453 | 57,213 | 4,392 | 203 | 240 |
| (17) 塗 装 | 11,024 | 10,920 | 795 | 58 | 104 |
| (18) 組 立・調 整 | 46,429 | 46,293 | 3,597 | 145 | 136 |
| (19) う ち 溶 接 | 3,955 | 3,955 | 551 | 39 | 0 |
| (20) 製 造 補 助 部 門 | 47,780 | 47,418 | 418 | 72 | 362 |
| (21) 管理事務及び技術労働者 | 74,050 | 74,042 | 922 | 154 | 8 |

Key:

1. Classification
2. Total
3. Direct workers
4. Total
5. Temporary workers thereof
6. Part-time workers
7. Workers other than direct
8. Total
9. Manufacturing division
10. Rough die materiel
11. Casting, forging
12. Heat treatment
13. Press, sheet metal
14. Welding thereof
15. Machine processing
16. Assembly
17. Coating
18. Assembly, adjustment
19. Welding thereof
20. Auxiliary manufacturing division
21. Management, clerical, and technical workers

Table 9. Kind of Workers and Personnel Deployed by Division (as of end of November)

Unit: Person)

| (1) 区 分 | (2) 完成車メーカー | | | (8) 協力メーカー | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------|----------|-----------------|------------|-----------|------------------|------|-----|--|
| | (3) 直用労働者 | | (7) 直用以外の労働者 | (9) 直用労働者 | | (13) 直用以外の労働者 | | | |
| | (4) 計 | (5) うち臨時 | (6) うちパート | (10) 計 | (11) うち臨時 | (12) うちパート | (12) | | |
| (14) 合 計 | 202,489 | 7,299 | 528 | 823 | 29,079 | 852 | 35 | 230 | |
| (15) 製 造 部 門 | 95,221 | 6,068 | 329 | 458 | 14,887 | 743 | 8 | 225 | |
| (16) 粗 型 材 | 25,014 | 1,178 | 86 | 284 | 4,328 | 186 | 0 | 105 | |
| (17) 鋳 造・鍛 造 | 7,810 | 303 | 80 | 242 | 499 | 89 | 0 | 0 | |
| (18) 熱 处 理 | 1,745 | 75 | 1 | 7 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| (19) プ レ 斯・板 金 | 15,459 | 800 | 5 | 35 | 3,809 | 97 | 0 | 105 | |
| (20) うち溶接 | 8,470 | 546 | 0 | 8 | 1,494 | 28 | 0 | 56 | |
| (21) 機 械 加 工 | 21,863 | 951 | 47 | 54 | 1,690 | 104 | 1 | 0 | |
| (22) 組 立 | 48,344 | 3,939 | 196 | 120 | 8,869 | 453 | 7 | 120 | |
| (23) 亜 装 | 8,787 | 710 | 56 | 50 | 2,133 | 85 | 2 | 54 | |
| (24) 組 立・調 整 | 39,557 | 3,229 | 140 | 70 | 6,736 | 368 | 5 | 66 | |
| (25) うち溶接 | 3,693 | 541 | 39 | 0 | 262 | 10 | 0 | 0 | |
| (26) 製 造補 助 部 門 | 42,264 | 344 | 66 | 357 | 5,154 | 74 | 6 | 5 | |
| (27) 管 理事 務 及 び 技 術 労 働 者 | 65,004 | 887 | 133 | 8 | 9,038 | 35 | 21 | 0 | |

Key:

1. Classification
2. Finished car makers
3. Direct workers
4. Total
5. Temporary workers thereof
6. Part-time workers thereof
7. Workers other than direct
8. Cooperating makers
9. Direct workers
10. Total
11. Temporary workers thereof
12. Part-time workers thereof
13. Workers other than direct
14. Total
15. Manufacturing division
16. Rough die materiel
17. Casting, forging
18. Heat treatment
19. Press, sheet metal
20. Welding thereof
21. Machine processing
22. Assembly
23. Coating
24. Assembly, adjustment
25. Welding thereof
26. Auxiliary manufacturing division
27. Management, clerical and technical workers